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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
KNUDSEN :JiliSIC COMPANY, a )
corporation,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.

J.A.CK

\

Case No.
7696

~IASTERSON,

Defendant and Appellant. ,

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF FACTS
(All italics, unless otherwise noted, are appellant's).
In this action, plaintiff, Knudsen Music Company,
sued the defendant, Jack Masterson, to recover damages
for the breach of a conditional sales contract, after the
coin operated music machines sold to defendant had
been repossessed (Ex. A, R. 3). The contract sued upon
is a title retaining contract containing the usual provisions for remedies of the vendor in case of default
(Ex. A).
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For the convenience of the Court, the following portion of paragraph six of the contract relating to rights
after repossession is set out below:
4

'In the event of such repossession seller 1nay
resell the said property at either public or private
sale without demand for performance, with or
without notice to purchaser (if given notice by
I nail to address below shall be sufficient) with or
without having such property at the place of sale,
and upon such terms and in such manner as seller
may determine; seller may bid at any sale. The
proceeds of any such sale, after deducting all
liens, expenses for retaking, repairing and selling such property, including a reasonable attorney fee or other expense incurred, shall be applied
to the amount due under this- contract and the
surplus, if any, shall be paid to purchaser; in the
event of a deficiency remaining after the exercise
of any of the remedies herein provided for, purchaser agrees to pay the amount of such deficiency
forthwith and any reasonable attorney fee and
court costs incurred for the recovery of such
deficiency."
The case was tried before the Court and plaintiffs
given judgment for the sum of $748.11, representing
the balance due on purchase price after allowing defendant a credit for the repossessed machines of $1,185.00,
and allowing plaintiff $30.00 for services in picking up
the music machines and $42.15 finance charges. In addition, plaintiff was allowed $200.00 attorney's fee and
costs, a total judgment of $964.51. Defendant appeals
from this judgment.
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The final contraet "~as entered into on ~....,ebruary 27,
1950, upon the transfer of t\Yo ~[odel 1100 Wurlitzer
Phonograph n1achines, included in ~ previous title retaining contract, to the vendor by the Yendee in exehange
for two Model 1080 \\:rurlitzer Phonographs. These
1100's w·ere replaced by 1080's because of complaints
that the 1100's \vere defective (Tr. -±5, 69, 89, 90). The
defendant had already in his possession two Model 1015
\Vurlitzer Phonograph machines and one Gismo, 'vhieh
'vere included in the contraet (Ex. A, Tr. 6, 9, 10, 42,
44).

The two Model 1080 Phonograph machines, Serial
Nos. 1949532 and 1950227, were picked up by the defendant on February 27, 1950, in Provo, Utah, at plaintiff's
place of business.
The J\Iodel 1080 machines were represented to the
defendant as new 1naehines and according to plaintiff's
testimony, the plaintiff did not examine the machines
before shipment to defendant and didn't know of their
condition (Tr. 42, 43, 51). After defendant, Jack Masterson, had taken the two Model 1080's to Panguitch,
he noticed that upon unpacking the crates, the mechanical
portions of these phonographs were covered with rust
and corrosion (Tr. 69).
After spending three or four days on each machine
in removing the rust and corrosion (R. 69), defendant
placed the machines on location, one at Ruby's Cafe,
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Escalante, Utah, and the other at the Big Rock Candy
Mountain in Marysvale Canyon. The machines were
out on location for approximately five weeks, when the
defendant removed the same because they did not operate satisfactorily (Tr. 71).
Defendant testified that one or two extra serVIce
calls were required each week on the Model 1080's after
they were placed on location ( Tr. 72). He testified that
the trouble was caused principally by the changer jamming (Tr. 73). In April of 1950, Knudsen, the president
of plaintiff, had a conversation with defendant regarding
the jamming of the machines, and Knudsen advised him
to use some oils to rectify the situation. Later, defendant wrote the plaintiff stating that he was going to lose
his two best locations if the Model 1080's were not removed (Tr. 76).
The testimony is uncontradicted that the machines
would not operate until the rust and corrosion was
cleaned off (Tr. 84), and that the machines would not
retain an adjustment. The evidence is also uncontradicted that the changers, which are an integral part
of the machines, would jam continually, requiring additional service calls at a great expense to defendant (Tr.
86). The testimony of Perry Masterson, defendant's
son, who was employed by his father for a short time
in servicing the machines, was also to the effect that
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the changer jannning- '""a~ the n1ain en use of the trouble,
and that it 'vas necessary to n1ake one or t'vo Pxtra service calls per 'Yeek in keeping the t"'"o n1achines operating
(Tr. 95, 96, 97).
\Y- esley I\::nudsen, president of plaintiff company,

testified that the Inachines were repossessed in April
of 1950, due to the non-payinent of installments as provided for in the contract (Ex. A).
On June 30, in preparing an inventory for tax purposes, the plaintiff testified that it utilized \vha.t is known
as a cash-box price list, giving the average retail value
of the various types of coin operated music machines,
and set up the value of the inventory solely on the basis
of the average prices according to the cash box list (Tr.
29, 31, 40), but no cash box price list was received in
evidence. The value of the repossessed machines as of
June 30, the end of plaintiff's fiscal year, was arrived
at arbitrarily by giving a credit to the defendant on
plaintiffs books of a certain amount supposedly representing the value of the property at the time . (Ex. E,
Tr. 29, 31).
After repossession, the music machines were put on
the floor of plaintiff's sales room and offered for sale
to anyone that came into the sales room (Tr. 25). The
machines

were

not

differentiated from

the

other

machines on the floor and were off2red for sale along
with regular merchandise. Plaintiff, Wesley Knudsen,
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testified that he didn't know where the machines had
gone until we checked on the price on the list (Tr. 26).
The machines were not marked as separate 1nachines
on repossession (Tr. 26). The Gisn1o machine was arbitrarily given a value of $35.00 without any reference to
a market value at the time or without any evidence of
a resale value (Tr. 15, 16).
One Model 1015 Wurlitzer phonograph could not
be traced and plaintiff testified that it was not known
how much it had sold for, but he thought that it had
been sold. Plaintiff also testified that they could not
trace this particular machine inasmuch as it had no
serial number by which it could be traced (Ex. A, Tr.
19, 20, 50, 55). Wesley Knudsen, president of plaintiff
company, testified that, after the machines were repossessed, he acted as owner and tried to sell the machines
to anyone that came along and that the same were resold
over a period of four or five months after repossession
(Tr. 47), but all evidence of resale was stricken from the
record upon plaintiff's motion (Tr. 39). After repossession of the machines, plaintiff filed this action to
recover damages for the breach of the contract. At the
trial of the case the only evidence adduced as to the value
of the machines at the time of repossession was a journal
entry from plaintiff's books, showing a credit of $1,150.00
for the four music boxes, plus $35.00 for the Gismo
machine (Ex. E). The price or value of these machines,
except the Gismo, was arrived at without reference to
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the actual resale value of the particuln r 1naehines 1nvolYed. The rredit \\yas giYen defendant as of tl une 30,
at the time of making the inventory, 'vhich 'vas prepared
priinarily for the purpose of ascertaining the amount
of taxes due by plaintiff (Tr. 15, 16, 26, 27). The defendant in his answer denied that the contract was ever
completed and alleged that the contract was rescinded
(R. 6).

The Court in its findings at page 115, stated that
the plaintiff sues to recover damages for breach of contract (Tr. 115). The Court further found that the contract is a title retaining obligation (117), and that, although there were some minor defects in the machines,
the Court found that there was no representation on
the part of the plaintiff as to the condition of the
machines, and that any representation made or defect
in the machines is innnaterial (Tr. 117).
At page 119 of the record, the Court stated its findings as follows:
"The Court therefore finds that the plaintiff
has been damaged in a breach of the contract in
the sum of $748.11."
Defendant appeals from the judgment entered.

STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ENTERING JUDGMENT
IN FAVOR OF PLAINTIFF, SAID JUDGMENT BEING
CONTRARY TO THE LAW AND THE EVIDENCE.
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POINT II.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN MAKING AND ENTERING FINDING OF FACT No. 4, TO THE EFFECT THAT
THE PLAINTIFF HAS DONE AND PERFORMED ALL OF
THE STIPULATIONS AND CONDITIONS OF THE CONTRACT TO BE PERFORMED BY IT, SAID FINDING BEING
CONTRARY TO THE EVIDENCE.

POINT III.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN MAKING AND ENTERING FINDING OF FACT No. 9, TO THE EFFECT THAT
THE SUl\1 OF $1,185.00 WAS THE REASONABLE VALUE
OF THE MACHINES, SAID FINDING BEING CONTRARY
TO THE EVIDENCE.

POINT IV.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN MAKING AND ENTERING FINDING OF FACT No. 10, TO THE EFFECT THAT.
ANY DEFECT IN THE MACHINES IS IMMATERIAL, AND
FINDING OF FACT No. 11, TO THE EFFECT THAT THERE
IS NO EVIDENCE OF A RESCISSION OF THE CONTRACT,
SAID FINDINGS BEING CONTRARY TO THE EVIDENCE.

POINT V.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN MAKING AND ENTERING CONCLUSION OF LAW No.1, TO THE EFFECT THAT
PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO A JUDGMENT AGAINST
THE DEFENDANT IN THE AMOUNT OF $1,860.96, THERE
BEING NO FINDING OR EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE
SAME.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ENTERING JUDGMENT
IN FAVOR Of PLAINTIFF, SAID JUDGMENT BEING
CONTRARY TO THE LAW AND THE EVIDENCE.
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Appellanfs first point is that the trial eourt erred
in entering judgment in favor of the plaintiff, and that
the judgrnent is contrary to the law and the evidence.
The trial court found, in effect, that plaintiff, after
repossession of the rnachines, had been darnaged by
defendant's breach of contract and was entitled to the
difference between the contract price and the market
value of the n1achines at the time of the alleged breach.
It is defendant's contention that the rights of parties
after such repossession were to be deterrnined solely by
the terms of the contract, and after the goods are retaken by the seller, the buyer shall not be liable until
the goods have been resold and insufficient realized
therefrom to pay the balance due seller. There was no
evidence that any of the machines had been re-sold (Tr.
39), and it is defendant's further contention that plaintiff's suit was prematurely filed and should be dismissed
because of failure to sell any of the machines in question
prior to instituting this action. In the case of Rhodes v.
O'Neil, et al. (Wash.), 265 Pac. 737, the court, in construing a similar provision in a conditional sales contract, stated at page 738 of Vol. 265 of the Pacific
Reporter:
"The note provided for a resale at public or
private sale and an agreement to pay any balance
remaining after the net proceeds had been applied.
There had been no sale of the automobile, ·and
therefore could be no application of net proceeds
as provided in the note. The contingency named
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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in the note had not yet arrived, even if it be
assumed, as appellants contend, that MacDonald
was bound by his note to pay the balance due.
"The judg1nent is affirmed."
Under the contract sued upon, the rights and remedies of the parties after repossession are clearly set
out. Paragraph 6 of Ex. A provides in part as follows :
"In the event of such repossession seller may
resell the said property at either public or private
sale without demand for performance, with or
without notice to purchaser (if given notice by
mail to address below shall be sufficient) with
or without having such property at the place of
sale., and upon such terms and in such manner
as seller may determine; seller may bid at any
sale. The proceeds of any such sale, after deducting all liens, expenses for retaking, repairing and
selling such property, including a reasonable attorney fee or other expense incurred, shall be applied to the amount due under this contract and
the surplus, if any, shall be paid to purchaser; in
the event of a deficiency remaining after the exercise of any of the remedies herein provided for,
purchaser agrees to pay the amount of such deficiency forthwith and any reasonable attorney
fee and court costs incurred for the recovery of
such deficiency."
,
The above provision is identical, word for word, to
a clause construed in the case of Hampton v. Commercial

Credit Corporation, et al (Mont.), 176 P. (2d) 270. See
page 274 of Vol. 176 of the Pacific Reporter, 2nd Series,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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where the court

~et8

out in full paragraph 6 of the con-

tract there being considered, \Yhich is identical to paragraph 6 of Exhibit A. The question arose in that case
as to when the rights of a buyer under the conditional
sales contract \\·ere ter1ninated. The following language
appears at page 27 4 of the Pacific Reporter:
··4.\.ppellants' contention that plaintiff had no
interest in the automobile or in the conditional
sale contract after the automobile had been repossessed by the Commercial Credit Corporation
on July 25, 1942, cannot be sustained. The conditional sale contract reads in part as follows :
'The undersigned Seller hereby agrees to
sell, and the undersigned Purchaser agrees to
purchase, subject to the terms and conditions
hereinafter set forth, * * *'
"6. Time is of the essence of the contract and if Purchaser defaults in complying
\vith any of the terms or conditions hereof,
or Seller deem himself insecure or the property in danger of misuse, depreciation or confiscation, * * *. The proceeds of any such
sale, after deducting all liens, expenses for
retaking, repairing and selling such property,
including a reasonable attorney fee or other
expense incurred, shall be applied to the
amount due under this contract and the surplus, if any, shall be paid to Purchaser; in the
event of a deficiency remaining after the
exercise of any of the remedies herein provided for, Purchaser agrees to pay the
amount of such deficiency forthwith and any
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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reasonable attorney fee and court costs incurred for the recovery of such deficiency.'
(Emphasis ours.)
"The defendants exercising a right or option
under the contract, to-wit: The sale of the automobile on December 22, 1942, to Seavey; the
plain tiff under the terms and conditions of the
contract would have been entitled to receive any
surplus of the proceeds of the sale, consequently
the contract was not terminated before the date
of the sale, which date was subsequent to the enactment of the amendment to the Soldiers' and
Sailors' Civil Relief Act."
In the case at bar, the defendant's rights in the contract were not terminated until a resale of the 1nusic
machines, and the plaintiffs could have no right to dan1ages at the time of the alleged default. In the case of
Hampton v. Commercial Credit Corporation, supra, the
Supreme Court of Washington issued a supplemental
opinion on rehearing as to the question of when the
buyer's rights terminated. At page 279 of the Pacific
Reporter, 2nd S.eries, appears the following:
"On rehearing the appellants contend that
the repossession of the automobile on July 25,
1942, after the default of Hampton, completely
terminated the conditional sale contract and that,
consequently, the Soldie-rs' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act as amended October 6, 1942, 50 U.S.C.A.
Appendix, § 501 et seq., has no application.
"With this contention we cannot agree.
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·· . .-tfter the repossession of the aufo1nobile the.
contract (subject to applicable statutes) still
measured the rights and renredies of the parties
thereto, and -it u·as to the. ternzs of the contract
that the parties had to resort, or rely upon, in asse rtilrg a-ny claims or rights after repossession.

Hit follows that the rights and remedies of
the parties under the contract were not completely
extinguished at the time of the repossession of
the auton1obile. ~When the law speaks of a right
or obligation as extinguished, it means that it is
put out; taken away, destroyed.' 35 C. J. S·., Extinguish, page 293.
'~It

also follows that the contract was not completely terminated by the repossession of the
automobile. ·'Termination' or 'cancellation' of a
conditional contract means to abrogate so much
of it as remains unperformed, doing away with an
existing agreement upon the terms and with the
consequences mentioned in the writing * * * ." San:.
born v. Ballanfonte, 98 Cal. App. 482, 277 P. 152,
155.
"The termination of a conditional contract, as
stated in the case of Sanborn v. Ballanfonte, 98
Cal. App. 482, 277 P. 152, mea~s to put an end to
all of the unperformed portions thereof." Blodgett
v. Merritt Annex Oil Co., 19 Cal. App. 2d 169, 65
p. 2d 123, 125.
"It is clear that the conditional sale contract
was not fully terminated prior to December 22,
1942, for the reason. that the defendants having
sold the a11rtomobile on the above date, the rights,
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liabilities and remedies of the parties were. not
fully determined or terminated under the contract
nntil that time and therefore the Soldiers' and
Sailors' Civil Relief Act applies."
Plaintiff's rights after repossession were governed
by the provisions of the con tract (Ex. A.). There is no
evidence of a resale to the account of the buyer. The
plaintiff took the merchandise back into his display roorn
and treated the repossessed stock as he would any other
(Tr. 26). He testified that he acted as owner of the same,
and there was no evidence of a resale within any reasonable period after repossession, or at all. Knudsen, president of plaintiff company, testified that he had no idea
what happened to the music machines after being placed
on the sales floor, until he checked his records (Tr. 26).
In preparing an inventory of his complete stock of merchandise for tax purposes, Knudsen arbitrarily placed
a value on all items and equipment used in his business,
among which were included the machines repossessed
from defendant. It is defendant's contention that such
conduct, and refraining from selling the machines to the
account of buyer for a reasonable time, precludes any
recovery whatsoever, and further, that the buyer is
not bound to accept as credit the value of the repossessed
property at the time of taking. The burden of showing
a resale is upon the seller.
In a syllabus prepared by the court in the case of
Hargett v.

M~tscogee

Bank, Court of Appeals of Georgia,
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124 S.E. 541, the court stated the general rules applicable
to the above facts, as follows :

'-3. In a suit by the seller against the purchaser to recover the unpaid purchase 1noney,
where the seller has retaken the property, the
evidence will not authorize a recovery for the
plaintiff in any a1nount whatever until the plaintiff has carried the burden of showing a resale
of the property under the terms of the contract
and the amount realized by him upon such resale. * * *
4. It is the purchaser's right under the
contract to have the property resold after it has
been retaken by the seller, and therefore the purchaser is not bound to accept, as a credit upon the
unpaid purchase money, an amount representing
the value of the property at the time it is retaken
by the seller.
H

"5. * * * Where, however, the seller, after
retaking the property for the purpose of resale
as provided in the contract, refrains from selling
it for an unreasonable length of time, and devotes
it to a use inconsistent with an intention upon his
part to resell it as the agent of the purchaser, the
inference that the seller has converted the property to his own use and has thereby rescinded the
sale is authorized."
It is admitted that in a proper case, a deficiency
can be recovered, but only after a resale, if the contract
so provides. The general rule is set forth in Volume 3,
Jones on Chattel Mortgages & Conditional Sales, Bowers
Ed., Sec. 1327, as follows:
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Recovering deficiency after resale.-There are rillinerous forms of conditional
sale contracts which have caused many divergent
opinions relating to questions arising under them.
Many of such contracts provide that on default
of the buyer the seller may take possession and
sell the property on account of the buyer, crediting him with the proceeds of the resale, and hold
hin1 liable for any deficiency in the price. As a
general rule, the validity of such a stipulation
is given full effect by the courts, and the seller
is held entitled, after a resale in accordance with
the provisions of the contract, to sue and recover
any balance remaining after crediting on the purchase-price the proceeds of the. sale. This effect
has been given to a stipulation authorizing the
seller to retake possession and resell, as this
necessarily implies that the resale shall be on account of the buyer, and that any deficiency toward
the satisfaction of the price shall be paid by the
buyer."
"§

1327

With respect to the right of the vendor under a
conditional sales contract to recover damages, see Vol.
3, Jones on ·Chattel Mortgages and Conditional Sales
Supra, Section 1372 :
"§ 1372. Against vendee for breach of contract.-:!<· * * It is obvious that his remedy may not

be in. damages for the mere default of the vendee
in performing the condition of the contract for
any action he then takes is either upon the contracfor as a recission of it. He may, however, be
entitled ·to damages for a wrongful detention of
the goods."
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One of the questions to be deter1nined on this appeal,
according to appellanfs Yie"T' is 'vhether a conditional
vendor, who after retaking goods does not sustain the
burden of proving a resale in accordance with the stipulations of the contract, is entitled to recover any portion
of the balance due under the contract. A resale by the
conditional vendor is not required by the contract, but
failure to resell n1aterially affects the rights of the
parties. It is submitted that under the contract sued upon
the buyer is not liable until the goods retaken have been
sold to his account, and in the absence of showing a resale, the seller has no other remedy.
The trial court substituted its own remedies in place·
of those the parties to the contract had agreed upon.
This it can not do. Regardless of the theory we attach
to plaintiff's case, it is submitted that the judgment cannot be sustained, and is contrary to the law and the evidence.
POINT II.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN M.AKING AND ENTERING FINDING OF FACT No. 4, TO THE EFFECT THAT
THE PLAINTIFF HAS DONE AND PERFOR.MED ALL OF
THE STIPULATIONS AND CONDITIONS OF THE CONTRACT TO BE PERFORMED BY IT, SAID FINDING BEING
CONTRARY TO THE EVIDENCE.

Because of their defective condition, defendant had
returned two Model 1100's to plaintiff in exchange for
two new Model 1080's, at the time of entering into the
contract sued upon. A brief perusal of the record will
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indicate the difficulties encountered by defendant in attempting to operate these supposedly new machines.
These 1080's were rusted and corroded to the extent that
they would not operate properly, and jammed continually. Defendant finally took them off location when circumstances became such· that he could not operate them
further. These were supposely new machines (Ex. A).
It is appellant's position that the plaintiff did not
perform its contract in that the machines were not new
machines, and because of plaintiff's breach there could be
no default on the part of the defendant. See Estrich on

Installment Sales, Sec. 305, which reads as follows:
"Until seller has complied with his agreements, there can be no default on the part of the
buyer entitling the seller to take possession."
See Jones on Chattel Mortgages and Conditional

Sales, supra, Vol. 3, S·ec. 1285 :
"Where seller is at fault.-Analogous to the
equitable principle that he who seeks equity must
do equity, is the legal rule pertinent to the present
discussion, that a conditional vendor who asserts
rights based on the alleged default of his vendee
can not maintain them if. he himself is in default
in the performance of some phase of the contract
obligatory upon him.
It is submitted that said finding is contrary to the
evidence.
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POINT III.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN MAKING AND ENTERING FINDING OF FACT No. 9, TO THE EFFECT THAT
THE SUM OF $1,185.00 WAS THE REASONABLE VALUE
OF THE MACHINES, SAID FINDING BEING CONTRARY
TO THE EVIDENCE.

Appellant's point three raises the question of
whether there is sufficient evidence to sustain a finding
that $1,185.00 was the reasonable value of the machines
at the time the credit was entered on plaintiff's books.
From appellant's viewpoint the value of the machines
as of June 30, 1950 has no bearing on the rights of the
parties involved, and becomes of importance only if it
can be said that the trial court proceeded under the correct theory of law.
There is no evidence of the value of the "Gismo"
machine, except that a value of $35.00 was placed on it
in the journal entry, without reference to its actual market value or resale value at the time (Tr. 15, 16).
There is no evidence that the value placed on the
music machines in the journal entry corresponded to
Cash Box Price Lists, or that the actual resale value, or
mechanical condition at the time, of each machine was
considered. Further, theTe was no evidence whatsoe,ver
as to the value of one of the Model 1015's repossessed by
plaintiff. One of the Model 1015's could not be traced by
serial number, and the matter of its value was left entirely to conjecture (Tr. 19, 20, 50, 55).
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It is submitted that plaintiff failed in its burden of
proof, and that said finding is contrary to the evidence.

POINT IV.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN MAKING AND ENTERING FINDING OF FACT No. 10, TO THE EFFECT THAT
ANY DEFECT IN THE MACHINES IS IMMATERIAL, AND
FINDING OF FACT No. 11, TO THE EFFECT THAT THERE
IS NO EVIDENCE OF A RESCISSION OF THE CONTRACT,
SAID FINDINGS BEING CONTRARY TO THE EVIDENCE.

Considerable testimony was received in support of
defendant's contention that the Model 1080's were defective, and the trial court held that any defe.cts were
immaterial. The machines were put on location in the
early part of March, 1950 (Tr. 70). During the early
part of April, 1950, defendant testified that he advised
plaintiff of the defective condition of the machines in a
phone call (Tr. 75). Later in April, 1950, defendant
wrote plaintiff a letter to the e,ffect that he was going to
lose his two best locations if the Model 1080's were not
removed, and that he just couldn't go further with them
(Tr. 76). Defendant also testified as to a conversation
in plaintiff's office during the latter part of April, 1950,
relative to picking up the machines (Tr. 77). Defendant
testified that he would not pay for the truck to come
down and pick up the machines because of a previous
misunderstanding with plaintiff about a shipment of machines from Denver whe-re he was stuck for a big freight
bill (Tr. 77). The evidence is unoontradicted that conSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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tinual jamming of the machines \Vas due to the corrosion and pitted condition, \vhich defendant was unable
to correct.
It is appellant's contention that the defects in the
machines were material, and that defendant was entitled
to, and did, rescind the sale, and his liability under the
contract ended. The general rules as to a defense to an
action of this type are set out in Jones on Chattel Mortgages and Conditional Sales, Vol. 3, Sec.1331:
Defenses and counterclaims to
purchase-price action. - * * * Rescission of the
contract is a defense to an action for the purchaseprice, if the facts show the essential elements of
a rescission and prompt and sufficient acts of
the vendee thereunder. The -rescission may have
been on account of failure of the vendor to do
something promised, or of fraud or false representations in the making of the contract and
which induced its making. Thus, neglect of the
conditional vendor to keep a typewriter in repair
as promised was held sufficient ground for a
rescission. One of the essentials of a rescission
is that the vendee must return, or offer to return,
the goods to the vendor or show why such return
can not be made. Moreover, the right of rescission
must be exercised promptly upon discovery by
the vendee of the facts which give rise to it, as
where the vendor is claimed to have made false
representations concerning the property."
"§

1331.

Further, it is appellant's contention that an implied
warranty of fitness for a particular purpose existed, and
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upon breach of this, defendant was entitled to, and in
fact rescinded the contract. In the case Battle Creek

Bread Wrap. Mach. Co. v. Paramount Baking Co., 88
Utah 67, 39 P. (2d) 323, the Supreme Court of Utah
stated, at page 72 of Vol. 88, Utah Reports, as follows:
"The parties apparently recognized that the
use of the trade-name of the machine was purely
a matter of convenience in designation. These
facts, considered along wi:th the fact that the
replacement arose out of complaints of defectiveness in the first machine, are rather substantial
evidence of the fact that no reliance was placed
upon the name of the article, but rather that the
parties were concerned with its fitness to accomplish its pul-pose. * * *
"However, we are of the opinion that there
was an implied warranty of fitness as to the substituted machine. It is hard to believe otherwise
when replacement arises out· of defects in the
machine replaced."
The taking of possession of the machines by plaintiff,
and exercise of dominion over them as owner, and failure to resell, precluded any other remedy. S-ee I. X. L.

Stores Co. v. Moon, 49 Utah 262, 162 Pac. 622.
It is submitted tha;t the court erred in finding that
the defects in the machines were immaterial, and that
the contract was not in fact rescinded.
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POINT \1".
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN MAKING AND ENTERING CONCLUSION OF LAW No.1, TO THE EFFECT THAT
PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO A JUDGMENT AGAINST
THE DEFENDANT IN THE AMOUNT OF $1,860.96, THERE
BEING NO FINDING OR EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE
SAME.

The court found, in its conclusions of law, that after
repossession of the machines, plaintiff was entitled to a
judgment in the sum of $1,860.96, the balance due on the

contract. It is submitted that the court was clearly erroneous in so making and entering this conclusion of law.
The general rule of law is well settled that a conditional
vendor cannot retake and repossess the property and
then recover the full balance of the contract price, as
though there had been no retaking. I.X.L. Stores Co.
v. Moon, supra. The proposition is so well settled as to

require no further citation of authority, and it is submitted that the court erred in making and entering said
conclusion of law, there being no finding or evidence to
support the same.
CONC·LUSION

In conclusion, it is submitted that the judgment of
the trial court was in error, and that the judgment should
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be reversed and an appropriate order entered dismissing the action, and that appellant should be awarded its
costs on this appeal.
R~spectfully

submitted,

S-KEEN, THURMAN & WORSLEY and
VERL C. RITCHIE,
Attorneys for Appellant.
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